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Planning for control against back contamination associated with
a Mars Surface Sample Return Mission (MSSR) might proceed from any of
several bases -- conceptual models and experience with the Lunar
Receiving Laboratory represent two such bases. Reports concerning the
LRL suggest that the provisions guarding against back contamination were
not as successful as desired and ought to be improved for a MSSR mission.
These reports also suggest that discrepancies in the performance of back
contamination provisions can be attributed largely to discrepancies in
the performance of people rather than to discrepancies in technology.
Such a suggestion is not unnatural given the highly advanced technology
associated with all operations of NASA.
The performance of people in an organization is not independent
of other organizational influences such as demands of technology,
organizational relationslifps, communications channels and the like.
Any organization (including LRL) is a multivariate system, and it is
difficult to attribute performance to any single variable in the system.
Generally speaking,	 can view any organization as a complex
	
four
different types of variables -- structure, technology, people and tasks,
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er.ch intrT!►WP8 wtrh the others (Figis— 0. Structure refers generally
to systems of communicatleN, authority, and work flow; technology refers
to tools, bor l, mechanical and programs; pecple are the actors in the system,
normally human being:.; and task refers to specific assignuents of work, roles
assigned to the acLcre. The behavior and performance of any organization
is a function of these major variables and their interactions, probably
more a function of interactions than of any single variable.
Effective performance of an organization requires appropriate balancing
among the major interacting variables in the r.ystem. Any change in one vari-
able requires an accommodating or comple r.entcry change in other variables.
For example, the assignment of task variables (role or tusk requirements)
will not accomplish a change in ,yrgdnizational performance if viewed by the
role incumbents as unnecessary:, impoHnIble, or arbitrary. Individuals are
no g likely to observe safety standards in performance of their tasks if these
standards are peeceived as unnecessary, arbitrary, or impossible. Similarly,
an apparently superior technology will not perform as designed if the actors
or people in the organization find the demands of that technology to be more
than they will submit; examples of people subverting a technology to perform
in what the pers,)ns belleve a "better way" abound in industry. While almost
all of these alterations in the application of a technology are perceived by
workers as improvements, not all of them are perceived as such by designers
and admiristrators of the technology. Finally, structure also influences or-
ganization performance, hindering cr facilitating accomplishment of organi-
zational goals. project management and matrix organization, for example,
were developed as structural approaches more appropriate to specific tasks
than more traditional organization structures.
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People comprise a unique element in the organizational matrix. In one
sense, people are the least manipulable element in the organization. While
technology, structure, and task can be altered at will, people are less easily
manipulated and serve as a constraint in the amount of variation permitted in
other variables. In another sense, people are the most flexible and adaptive
variable in the matrix. The people in an organization can make an apparently
inappropriate technology !rform well; they alas can prevent the realisation
of the capabilities of a a„ ►arently outstanding technology. Outstanding
people performance in an organization is still something of a myste"-'; we are
not certain what is required for outstanding team performance. Minimum re-
quirements appear to include cohesion among t.am members, clear operational
goals accepted and internalized by all, and trust Eased upon open coomunica-
tions and sharing of values and influence.
The NASA organization has been credited with a number of successes in
technological, administrative, and organization innovation. (See references
1-4) Yet we note that a variety of problems has been reported associated with
development and performance of safeguard against back contamination from the
now concluded Apollo f lights. These reports of problems are surpristug when
viewed against the background of spectacular successes in related NASA missions.
The reports of problems associated with back contamination protection also
constitute a source of concern in planning for the envisioned MSSR missions.
Planning for protection against back contamination from the envisioned MSSR
missions ought to proceed from an analysis of what, if anything, was or will.
be unique rbout programs of quarantine and protection against back contamination
for the Apollo and MSSR missions t-h^n viewed Pgtinst the framework of other
NASA operations.
t
A number of accounts have been written about NASA and its successes
in the areas of technology, organization, and administration. NASA has faced
a complex of diverse and dynamic environments, influences impacting on NASA
operations. The diversity of environmental pressures is indicated in the
range of scientific and professional interest groups, suppliers of sophisticated
instrumentation, industrial and economic pressures, and governmental and puliti-
cal pressures exerted upon NASA activities(Figurec II and III). Each of these
broad environmental pressures is further differentiated as, for example,
astronomers, physicists and biologists independently seek to influence NASA
research. Each of these environmental forces also is dynamic over time in the	 ^!
sense that objectives to management and organization have replaced the more
traditional "principlev approach" to management and organization. Organization-
al experimentation within NASA and complex industrial organizations has con-
trtui-!ed to developing knowledge of administrative and organizational contin-
gencies. Multinational firms engaged it quite dynamic industries, for examt,le,
provide nunerous illustrations of organizational experimentation to achieve
integration of often quite differentiated organizational sub-units. (See
references 5-11)
Several peroons associated with the LRL were interviewed about their
experiences, and file inform-tion was sought in an attempt to learn more
about the failures in performance at LRL. The evidence obtained indicated
that protection against back contamination was not viewed as a high priority
goal by operational teams within the LRL. it appears A s though the primary
goal of NASA was a successful flight mission and that goals relating to pro-
tection against back co,.tami.nW oa were held primarily by intero gted regulatory
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agenc:.es (HEW, Agriculture, Interior.) Tlie successful performance by NASA
of all responsibilities accepted as high priority goals by NASA makes it
difficult to believe that successful performance of back contamination pro,
visions would not have resulted if NASA had accepted these as goals. Rather,
It appears that the differentiated responsibilities for protection against
back r_oatamination were not successsully integrated among the responsible
agenci:s. The Inter Agency Committee on Back Contamination (ICBC) apparently
was established to serve to integrate responsibilities; it apparently was
dominated by NASA, however, and was not successful in the integration cf
responsibilities. Failure in this lack of integration of responsibilities
for back contamination probable was a primary reason that individuals per-
forming tasks in the LRL were less concerned with quarantine measures than
they might have been.
Several illustrations can be cited of the inability of the ICBC to
serve as an adequate integrating mechanism for the LRL activities; these
illustrations also point up the type of problem to be anticipated in planning
for the MSSR missions.
An often cited incident relates to the recovery of manned spacecraft
in the lunar missions. ICBC quarantine programs called for lifting
the manned space craft to the deck of a recovery vessel, attachment of
barriers around the space craft opening, and the exit of astronauts
from the space craft into a quarantine facility. Despite the development
and promulgation of these procedures, it is reported that NASA claimed
inability to lift the space craft to the deck of the recovery vessel
at a very late stage in the mission planning, and NASA was able to
obtain approval of the ICBC for exit of the astronauts without the
protection of quarantine barriers. Reports also indicate that NASA
a
developed the ability t^ lift space Craft from the sea relatively soon
after quarantine restrictions were lifted from the lunar Eample return
missions. One interpretation of this reported incident is that NASA
had (or could have developed) the ability to recover manned space
craft from the ocean, but that it was unwilling to keep the astronauts
behind quarantine barriers. This Interpretation in consistent with
the hypothesis that responsibilities for the lunar misf,ions were dif-
`erertiated among agencies and that NASA did not share the objec;.ivea
of quarantine protections. Rather, NASA objectives concerned the re-
turn of astronauts with samples for later analysis. This incident also
Illustrates the ability of NASA to dominate ICBC decisions -- part-time
members of the ICBC were not in a position to challenge the testimony
of NASA officials nor had the ICBC a capability independent of NASA
to develop capabilities to perform the reco , ery as originally planned.
Another illustration concerns the act+ins of the ICBC in relationship
to NASA. It has been reported :nat the ICBC did not communicate as a
body to NASA, e.g. the ICBC did not issue directives for 14ASA implementa-
tion. Rather, the ICBC reacted to ?ASA proposals and the primary form
of com.nunication between organizations was in the form of minutes of
ICBC meetings and resolutions of the ICBC. In short, the relationship
between the ICBC snd NASA was poorly defined. In one sense, the ICBC
ought have been an intor-agency committee of "equals" to serve as an
integrating mechanism; in fact., the ICBC was estab]i.hed as a co=ittee
advisory to NASA and, in that sense, as an insCrument of NASA.
present themselves:
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Implementation of ICBC resolutions apparently was not entrusted to
NASA line officials. P -.her, individuals such as Colonel Pickering
and Dr. Briggs Phillips worked in the capacity of integrating ICBC
objectives with those of NASA and scientists at the operations level.
The activities of these two individuals and their frustrations in
the accomplishment of their responsibilities testifies to the fact
that integration was not accomplished within the ICBC. One gets the
imprevaion that more integration between NASA objectives, quarantine
objectives and scientific objectives was accomplished at the Pickering-
Phillips level than at the ICBC level.
0 a illuutration of Pickering - Phillips integration efforts appears
in files related to the LRL project. Pickering and Phillips were
hired by NASA as consultants yet held primary affiliations with non-NASA
organizations. One file item is a memo directed to a NASA official
detailing shortcomings in LRL development; appended to this memo is a
memo of a later date directed to Dr. Sencer (PHS and ICBC) and written
by a ;NASA official. The implication is that the original memo directed
within NASA was also communicated to Dr. Sencer whose support was
sought in the correction of LRL development problems. Whatever authority
Pickering and Phillips possessed appears to have been a function if
their uon-NASA affiliations and probably was not particularly enhanced
by the ICBC itself.
The clear inference drawn from our investigations is that the ICBC
did not serve to integrate the objectives and reapon:!bilites of NASA, PHS,
Agriculture and Interior. We cannot at this point recommend a similar
organizational framework for planned USSR missions. Several other possibilities
4
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1) Responsibilities for all aspects of space exploration, including
the return of samples from outer space, might be centralized in an
organization such as NASA. NASA might be -ipected to establish differ-
entiated subordinate organizations responsible for specific aspects of
space exploration including protection against extra-terrestrial contnm-
ination. Such a subordinate organization might interface with other
interested parties and pressure groups but full authority for decisions
regarding protection against extra-terrestrial contamination would reside
within NASA. Furtb"C, conflicts between this subordinate organization
and other subordinate organizations with different responsibilities would
be integrated' within the NASA organization.
Thie approach would require changes in existing legislation which
currently provides for differentiation of responsibilities for protection
against extra-terrestrial contamination. Such an approach probably would
accomplish a more efficient integration of responsibilities than was
accomplished in the LRL experience. This integration would in all like-
lihood be accomplished at the expense of the .advantages associated with
specialization and diffetentiation, however. Whether the net result	 I
would be more or less effective than the outcomes of the LRL experience
Is questionable.
2) Another approach would be to maintain the current differentiation of
responsibilities among Federal agencies and to seek organizational vahicles
for integration which would be more effective than the ICBC. Several such
approaches can be suggeFted; others might be designed as well.
iI	 ^
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one alternative might call for the creation of an ICHC-type of organiza-	 1
Lion responsible to the President for protection against extra-terrestrial
contamination. This organization would be provided funds adequate to
carry out its responsibilitieu and would not be dependent upon N&SA for
funding. Further, NASA would participate as a single member of the
organization equal to other members and would not be allowed to dominate
organizational decisison making. 	
I
Another alternative might permit each involved agency to exercise its
responsibilities as appropriate, e.g. PHS and Agriculture, for example,
night treat each returning mission as it would any attempted entry into
the United States. This exercise of responsibilities only at time of
attempted entry would be quite troublesome for NASA planning and would
call forth efforts by NASA to secure aL •a nce approval of plans; however,
responsibility for coordination would clearly be a responsibility of
NASA. A variety of specific approaches by NASA within this general frame-
work ore possible including, for example, requesting the involved agencies
to assign responsible personnel to work in combination with NASA personnel
on specific projects.
It is our intent in the next year's effort to generate a range of possible
organizational models which might be - applied in'tha developuent cnd dpplicn-
tion of pro-rams for protection against possible extra-terrestrial cont=ina-
Lion. Lacking any method for empirical testing of these models, we will
simulate tests of them using methods of conceptual analysis. In so far as
possible, the implications of each proposed organization will be identified
and the models compared in terms of expected outcomes.
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